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Abstract
We introduce the Speculative Influence Network (SIN) to decipher the causal relationships
between sectors (and/or firms) during financial bubbles. The SIN is constructed in two steps.
First, we develop a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) of regime-switching between a normal market
phase represented by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) and a bubble regime represented by
the stochastic super-exponential Sornette-Andersen (2002) bubble model. The calibration of the
HMM provides the probability at each time for a given security to be in the bubble regime. Con-
ditional on two assets being qualified in the bubble regime, we then use the transfer entropy to
quantify the influence of the returns of one asset i onto another asset j, from which we introduce
the adjacency matrix of the SIN among securities. We apply our technology to the Chinese stock
market during the period 2005-2008, during which a normal phase was followed by a spectacu-
lar bubble ending in a massive correction. We introduce the Net Speculative Influence Intensity
(NSII) variable as the difference between the transfer entropies from i to j and from j to i, which
is used in a series of rank ordered regressions to predict the maximum loss (%MaxLoss) endured
during the crash. The sectors that influenced other sectors the most are found to have the largest
losses. There is a clear prediction skill obtained by using the transfer entropy involving industrial
sectors to explain the %MaxLoss of financial institutions but not vice versa. We also show that the
bubble state variable calibrated on the Chinese market data corresponds well to the regimes when
the market exhibits a strong price acceleration followed by clear change of price regimes. Our re-
sults suggest that SIN may contribute significant skill to the development of general linkage-based
systemic risks measures and early warning metrics.
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that the backdrop of almost every proceeding financial bubble is the preva-
lence of speculative mania, which causes valuation to drift out of whack, associated with a re-
inforcing imbalance between the size of unrealized supply and demand intentions, which forms
the genesis of the potential market collapse. Speculative mania is by and large embodied in a
variety of herding behaviors when investors imitate and follow other investors’ strategies while
tending to suppress their own private information and beliefs (Devenow and Welch, 1996; Avery
and Zemsky, 1998). Such imitation can be either rational or irrational. Rational herding results
from different possible mechanisms, such as (i) the anticipation by rational investors concerning
noise trader’s feedback strategies (Long et al., 1990), (ii) Ponzi schemes resulting from agency
costs, (iii) monetary incentives given to competing fund managers (Dimitriadi, 2004; Dass et al.,
2008) and (iv) rational imitation in the presence of uncertainty (Roehner and Sornette, 2000). In
contrast, irrational herding is driven by market sentiment (Banerjee, 1992), fad (Bikhchandani
et al., 1992), informational cascades (Barberis et al., 1998), ‘word-of-mouth’ effects from social
imitation or influence (Shiller, 2000; Hong et al., 2005) or irrational positive feedback trading
from extrapolation of past growth rate (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).
The challenge of diagnosing bubbles can thus be reduced to the detection and characterization
of the regularities associated with herding effects in real time, with the goal of predicting the
potential upcoming regime-shift and possible large sell-off resulting from their evolution. Most
existing analyses have emphasized herding of the overall market, considering that investors tend to
synchronize their behavior across the whole investment horizon. Accordingly, methods to detect
bubbles have been focused mostly on representations of the whole market performance, in general
by using market indices. The rationale is that, during bubble regimes when widespread speculative
behavior is prevalent, individual stocks tend to become cross-sectionally more tightly correlated
in their behavior and follow the general market dynamics. Notwithstanding this fact, the focus
on market indices rather than the constituting individual stocks is bound to overlook endogenous
structures of herding within the universe of stocks (see e.g. Sias (2004), Choi and Sias (2009))
and could potentially miss useful patterns associated with the dynamics of speculation during the
bubble build up. In particular, the financial crisis of 2008 that followed a large bubble regime
(Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013; Sornette and Cauwels, 2014) suggests that there is important
information for the development of systemic risk metrics imbedded in the study of speculative
bubble behavior in disaggregated industrial or firm level.
This paper presents an extension of more conventional bubble diagnosing methods by break-
ing down the structure of investment herding into its individual firm components. For this, we
introduce the novel concept of the Speculative Influence Network (SIN), defined as a directional
weighted network representing the causal speculative influencing relationships between all pairs
of investment targets. In other words, we quantify how speculative trading in one asset may draw
speculative trading in other asset. Here, we will focus on stocks, but the method is more generally
applicable to any basket of assets. Specifically, we first estimate in real time the probability of
speculative trading in each stock in the basket of interest, using a bubble identifying technique
that was introduced for whole market indices but that we now extend to individual stocks. The
strength of the bubble at the level of a single stock may increase or fade multiple times during
the development of a global market bubble, perhaps due to particular idiosyncratic properties of
the firm and of the corresponding industrial sector. The Hidden Markov Modeling (HMM) ap-
proach, which is specially designed to calibrate regime-switching processes, is thus a convenient
methodology to make our bubble detection approach at the individual stock level more robust.
Once we have characterized the subset of stocks being qualified in a bubble regime, we calculate
the Transfer Entropy (TE), which is a measure developed in Information Science to quantify the
casual relationship between variables. The underlying intuition behind this method is that, if a
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stock Y exhibits a strong speculative influence on another stock X, then the existence of specula-
tive trading of X can be predicated on the evidence of speculative trading on Y . In the language
of Information Science, there is an information flow from Y towards X, which is quantified by the
entropy transfer from Y to X.
The essential first step is of course to detect the presence of a bubble. For this, we borrow from
the simple and generic prescription that a bubble is a transient regime characterized by faster-than-
exponential (or super-exponential) growth (see e.g. (Hu¨sler et al., 2013; Kaizoji et al., 2015; Leiss
et al., 2015; Sornette and Cauwels, 2015; Ardila-Alvarez et al., 2015) for recent empirical tests
and models). The “super-exponential” behavior results from the existence of positive nonlinear
feedback mechanisms, for instance of past price increases on future returns rises (Hu¨sler et al.,
2013). Searching for transient super-exponential price behavior avoids the curse of other bubble
detection methods that rely on the need to estimate a fundamental value in order to identify an
abnormal pricing, the difference between the observed price and the supposed fundamental value
being attributed to the bubble component. This avoids the critique of Gurkaynak (2008) in his
study of the literature on rational bubbles and of econometric approaches applied to bubble detec-
tion, in which he reported that time-varying or regime-switching fundamentals could always be
invoked to rationalize any declared bubble phenomenon. The second merit of super-exponential
models is that they involve a mathematical formulation that inscribes the information on the end
of the bubble, in the form of the critical time tc at which the model becomes singular in the form
of an a hyperbolic finite-time singularity (FTS). Actually, the bubble can end or burst before tc,
since, in the rational expectation bubble framework combined with the FTS models, tc is just the
most probable time of the bubble burst but not the only one because various effects can destabilize
the price dynamics as time approaches tc (such as drying of liquidity).
The existing literature that has contributed until now to the concept of super-exponential bub-
ble can be divided into two classes: (a) bubbles with deterministic maximum termination time tc
and (b) bubbles with stochastic maximum termination time tc. The first class takes its roots in
the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model (Johansen et al., 1999, 2000). Developed within the
rational expectation framework, the JLS model translates the aggregate speculative behavior of in-
vestors into the existence of a critical dynamics associated with the self-organization of the system
of mutually influencing traders. A parsimonious mathematical representation takes the form of the
log-periodic power law singularity (LPPLS) dynamics. In addition to prices exhibiting a super-
exponential acceleration, there is a long-term volatility that accelerates according to log-periodic
oscillations embodying an accelerating cascade of exuberance followed by limited panics resum-
ing into exuberance and so on. In this framework, the critical time tc of the maximum duration of
the bubble is also the most probable market crash time if it occurs. This critical time is treated as
an intrinsic deterministic parameter in LPPLS bubble models. Since the introduction of the JLS
model, there has been plenty of theoretical development of the LPPLS bubble framework, in par-
ticular expanding on the underlying mechanisms (Sornette, 1998; Sornette and Johansen, 1998;
Ide and Sornette, 2002) and on model calibration (Zhou and Sornette, 2006a; Filimonov and Sor-
nette, 2013; Lin et al., 2014). Concurrently, the LPPLS literature has developed empirically with
both post-mortem studies of past bubbles as well as real-time ex-ante successful diagnostics of
bubbles in a variety of financial markets, including western stock markets (Johansen et al., 1999;
Johansen and Sornette, 2000; Sornette and Zhou, 2006), emerging stock markets (Johansen and
Sornette, 2001; Giordano and Mannella, 2006; Zhou and Sornette, 2009; Cajueiro et al., 2009;
Jiang et al., 2010), real-estate markets (Zhou and Sornette, 2006b, 2008), oil markets (Sornette
et al., 2009), forex markets (Johansen et al., 1999; Matsushita et al., 2006) and so on.
Compared with LPPLS models, the other class of super-exponential bubble models, which
explicitly consider the critical time tc as an endogenous random variable depending on the market
state and the investors’ aggregate expectations, have been much less explored. The Sornette-
Andersen super-exponential bubble model serves as the first attempt in this field (Sornette and
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Andersen, 2002; Andersen and Sornette, 2004). Under specific prescriptions of the nonlinear
positive feedback effects, these bubble models have been proved to have their random critical
times being distributed according to the inverse Gaussian distribution. Thereafter, the Sornette-
Andersen model has been extended to richer situations in which the critical time satisfies an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process (Lin and Sornette, 2013).
In this paper, we propose, in the first step of our investigations, to focus on the Sornette-
Andersen super-exponential bubble model as the primary prescription to develop diagnostics of
speculative trading, before developing in a second step the analysis of the structure of mutual
interactions between stocks. First, the Sornette-Andersen model has an elegant analytical solu-
tion and enjoys a more straightforward representation of speculative trading. Second, it is more
tractable within an integrated stochastic framework and allows for a natural and transparent imple-
mentation of the HMM approach, in which additional characteristics of speculation can be added.
A first addition can be the condition of the stationarity of the critical end time due to the lack of
synchronization. A second addition is the ingredient of log-periodicity of the long term volatility
due to the interplay between the inertia of transforming information into decision in the presence
of nonlinear momentum and price-reversal trading styles (Ide and Sornette, 2002).
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed speculative influence network (SIN),
we perform our empirical study on the Chinese stock market. As an emerging financial mar-
ket, the Chinese market has exhibited a number of dramatic bubbles and crashes (Jiang et al.,
2010; Sornette et al., 2015), reflecting strong herding activities developing in a more opaque in-
formation environment with less regulatory control than mature western markets (Piotroski and
Wong, 2011). A few previous works have revealed the existence of powerful speculative investors
manipulating the market with relative facility, like in the so-called “pump and dump” strategy
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zhou et al., 2005; He and Su, 2009). Additionally, less-informed small
and medium size Chinese investors have been shown to be prone to trend-chasing speculation (Li
et al., 2009). Moreover, empirical studies suggest an acute tendency of herding among Chinese in-
vestors (Tan et al., 2008; Chiang et al., 2010), especially for institutional investors whose herding
is found to play a role in destabilizing the whole market (Xu et al., 2013). From mid-2005, the two
major stock indices of the Chinese stock market, i.e., the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite
(SSEC) index and the Shenzhen Stock Component (SZSC) index, rose six-fold in just two years.
This extreme growth was then followed by a dramatic drop of about two-third of their peak val-
ues over a year. Though the transient prosperity of the financial market has been fueled by many
compelling growth stories concerning the rapid fundamental growth of the Chinese economy, the
roller-coaster performance of the whole market over the year of 2008 in particular offered hind-
sights about the existence of a bubble with a mixture of herding, over-optimistic speculation and
positive feedback trading (Jiang et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2014).
Our present study focuses on the Chinese stock market episodes from 2006 to 2008. To
test the predictability of large cumulative losses associated with financial sell-offs in the Chinese
stock market, we construct the SIN from 2006 to the end of 2007 when the market was still in a
bullish state. We then search for possible early-warning signals in the percentage maximum loss
(%MaxLoss) of each stock during 2008, using measures derived from the network-based analy-
sis. The network is constructed by using the representative stocks portfolios and indices of various
industrial sectors. Also, considering the implications to measure systemic risks, we expand the
single node representing the financial sector in the original network to become a full sub-network
made of all stocks from the financial sector, including banks, trust companies, securities firms and
insurance companies. Our main empirical findings is that the total net influence effect measured
with the Transfer Entropy (TE) method in industrial sectors (except for the financial sector and
for financial institutions) is a significant determinant of the %MaxLoss of a number of stocks.
Moreover, the gross TE to all industrial sectors significantly explains the %MaxLoss of financial
institutions, whereas the total TE to or from financial institutions are not good explanatory indi-
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cators to predict the %MaxLoss of non-financial sectors. These results suggest that the SIN can
not only be used to construct a cross-sectional anatomy of bubbles but can also help in comple-
menting the analytics of linkage-based systemic risk measures, by estimating the interconnection
of institutions with respect to their vulnerability to exuberant speculation.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 first introduces the Sornette-Andersen
super-exponential bubble model with stochastic termination times and then discusses the de-
tectability of speculative trading using the HMM approach from the regime-switching perspective
of bubble onset and burst. In Section 3, we investigate how to build the speculative influence net-
work (SIN) for a financial market with the help of the Transfer Entropy between stocks. Section
4 studies the practical relevance of the SIN and also explores possible measures of systemic risks
that can be derived from it. An empirical application is made to the Chinese stock market. Finally,
we conclude and sketch out potential extensions in Section 5.
2 Regime-Switching speculative bubbles with super
exponential growth
2.1 The Sornette-Andersen bubble model
According to the principle underlying the whole analysis of this paper, speculative trading during
a bubble is characterized by positive feedbacks, i.e., the higher the number of interested investors
and the higher the price, the larger the increase of new stock purchases and the higher the price
growth. Positive feedbacks are contributed by a large diversity of herding activities, leading to
copycats rushing to follow their leaders (Chincarini, 2012). It is worth noting that, while herding
has been largely documented to be a trait of noise traders, it is actually rational for bounded
rational agents to also enter into social imitation, because the collective behavior may reveal
information otherwise hidden to the agents. Moreover, even in the absence of information, it may
also be rational to imitate one’s social network because it may reflect the consensus who decisions
are incorporated in subsequent returns (Roehner and Sornette, 2000).
Once positive feedback takes over, the financial market, like all systems with positive feed-
back, enters a state of increasing unbalance, with unsustainable increasing rates of return. Positive
feedbacks lead to faster-than-exponential price appreciation: as prices increase, the expectation
of future growth increases even further, pushing anticipation of future returns upwards. This
means that the growth rate grows itself. As a constant growth rate of the price (namely, a con-
stant return) corresponds to an exponential price trajectory, a growing growth rate leads (in many
specifications) to a faster-than-exponential price path with a finite-time singularity signaling the
end of the bubble. The technical analysis literature casually refers to this pattern as “parabolic”
or “hyperbolic” growth because of the corresponding upward curvature (convexity) of the log-
price as a function of time. The important point for our purpose is that the transient faster-than-
exponential price path provides a diagnostic of speculative bubbles that is fundamentally different
from the standard academic methods that emphasize more the detection of just abnormal expo-
nential growth regimes above the fundamental price or of mildly explosive regimes. One could
term the regimes we refer to as being “super-explosive”, to emphasize the difference with the term
“explosive” often attributed to an exponential regime (which is the norm in finance and in eco-
nomics, as well as in demographics, because an exponential growth just reflects the mechanism
of proportional growth, which is nothing but compounding interest in finance).
In the context of speculative bubbles, the Sornette-Andersen model is arguably the most parsi-
monious representation to capture a transient “super-explosive” signature in a continuous stochas-
tic framework, which formulates the interplay between multiplicative noise and nonlinear positive
feedbacks onto future returns and volatility. According to the model, the price dynamics in the
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bubble regime is assumed to be described by the following stochastic differential equation (Sor-
nette and Andersen, 2002):
dp
p
= [ µ1(p) + µ2(p) ]dt + σ(p)dW − κd j (1)
where the first drift term µ1(p) = µpn, n > 0 represents the nonlinear positive feedback effect that
larger asset price feeds a larger growth rate (Hu¨sler et al., 2013), which leads to even larger price
and so on. The parameters µ and n are respectively the effective drift coefficient and strength of
nonlinear positive feedback effects. The diffusion part is specified by σ(p) = σpn, n > 0, with
the same strength of the nonlinear positive feedbacks of price, and can be interpreted as a con-
ditional nonlinear heteroskedasticity. Intuitively, the term may be rationalized by the prevalence
of hedging strategies using general Black-Scholes option models and of other herding behaviors
discussed before. The parameter σ denotes the magnitude of the stochastic component, which sets
the scale of volatility. The last term −κd j represents the crash, where d j = 1 when the crash occurs
and d j = 0 otherwise, and κ is the crash amplitude. The crash hazard rate h(t) := E[d j] (where
E[.] is the expectation operator) is specified by the condition of no arbitrage, which translates into
the fact that the price is a Martingale: E[ dpp ] = 0. This leads to
h(t) =
1
κ
(µ1(p) + µ2(p)) . (2)
Without the drift term µ2(p) and neglecting the crashes, expression (1) transforms into the
standard Stratonovich deterministic equation,
dp
p
= (µdt + σdW)pn, n > 0 (3)
giving the intuitive interpretation that the market noise dW gradually accumulates in the price
through a simple multiplicative mechanism reinforced by the nonlinear term pn.
The second drift term is set to be µ2(p) =
n + 1
2
σ2(p). As the market required a risk premium
for the existing volatility and upcoming crash, this term serves to balance the subtle interplay
between multiplicative noise and nonlinear positive feedbacks. With this additional convenient
device, Itoˆ calculation of these stochastic differential equations (1) can be drastically simplified,
as we will see soon.
The most striking feature of the model is that the nonlinearity (n > 0) creates a singularity in
finite time and the multiplicative noise makes it stochastic. To see this, let us first consider the
case σ→ 0 and κ → 0, for which eq.(1) reduces to the deterministic price dynamics dp
p
= µpndt,
whose solution reads
p(t) = (nµ)−
1
n [ tc − t ]− 1n , tc =
p−n0
nµ
(4)
where p0 = p(t = t0). Note that such deterministic dynamics is characterized by a fixed critical
time, tc, such that p(t) diverges when time approaches tc from below. This critical time is called a
movable singularity, because it depends on the initial condition p0 in addition to the parameters of
the model. Reintroducing a non-zero volatility, and conditional on the absence of a crash (d j = 0),
Itoˆ calculus applied to (1) provides the following explicit analytical solution (See Sornette and
Andersen (2002) for the complete derivation therein):.
p(t) = [ nµ(tc − t) − nσWt ]− 1n , tc =
p−n0
nµ
(5)
This solution recovers, as it should, the deterministic solution (4) for σ = 0. The price now ex-
hibits a stochastic behavior, which can still diverge when there is a time such that the denominator
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nµ(tc − t)− nσWt crosses 0. At t = 0, the denominator starts from an initial positive value nµtc. In
the presence of the negative drift −nµt and notwithstanding the presence of the Wiener process,
the denominator will cross 0 with probability 1. The corresponding stochastic critical time t˜c at
which the price diverges is thus controlled by a first-passage problem when the drifting random
walk motion nµt + nσWt first encounters the value nµtc = p−n0 . From standard results of first-
passage problems (Redner, 2001; Jeanblanc et al., 2009), the stochastic critical time t˜c is found to
be distributed according to the Inverse Gaussian distribution
t˜c ∼ IG
 p−n0nµ ,
[ p−n0
nσ
]2  . (6)
In fact, with the specification (1) augmented by (2), the price never diverges. This is because,
as the price accelerates, so does even more its instantaneous growth rate µ1(p)+µ2(p) and therefore
so does the crash hazard rate via expression (2). This is aimed at embodying the fact that the
bubble collapses as a result of the ebb of speculation and withdrawal of intended demand when an
unsustainable state is becoming more obvious or due to increasing scarcity of money and credit. In
other words, a crash always occurs before the price goes too high, ensuring long-term stationarity
(Sornette and Andersen, 2002).
Note that the price dynamics (5) reduces to the geometric random walk when the strength of
positive feedback vanishes (n = 0):
lim
n→0 p(t) = p0 · limn→0[ 1 − n(µt + σWt) ]
− 1n = p0 e µt+σWt , (7)
which is indeed the solution of the standard Black-Scholes framework obtained as the limit n→ 0
of equation (1) (with κ = 0).
2.2 Hidden Markov modelling (HMM) calibration approach
We propose to extend the Sornette-Andersen model summarized in the previous section by com-
bining it with a standard geometric random walk, supposed to represent the normal regime of
markets. The complete price process is then described by regime switching between the dy-
namics described by the Sornette-Andersen model with significantly positive value of n and the
degenerated geometric random walk for n = 0. Then, the existence of speculative trading can be
judged by estimating the probability that the market is in bubble state (n > 0) or in the normal
state (n = 0). For this, we convert the bubble model into a Hidden Markov modeling (HMM)
framework and then calibrate all parameters in the model to identify the onsets and ends of bub-
bles, following a procedure that we now describe. Because crashes represented by the jump term
d j in (1) as rare, we chose to not identify them and only rely on the structural differences between
the process conditional on no crash for n > 0 and n = 0.
For the sake of conciseness and efficiency of the presentation, in the following discussion,
we introduce a novel mathematical representation of probability distribution functions and of
conditional density functions. They resemble the famous “bra-ket” notations in Dirac notations
in Quantum Mechanics. To be clear, no new results are derived, it is just a notation used for its
compactness and coherence. The notations are as follows. We use “bra” to denote the probability
density for a random variable, i.e., 〈 x | := fx˜(x); We use “ket” to denote the “conditional on”
operation. Formal “multiplication” of a bra-vector and a ket vector gives the conditional density,
i.e., 〈 x | · |y 〉 = 〈 x | y 〉 := fx˜|y˜(x|y). In the Appendix A, we show that, with the addition of a
few formal transformation rules, more complicated expressions can be nicely represented, such
as the decomposed conditional joint density or Bayesian formulas for multivariate conditional
densities. This is convenient to present the derivation of the formulas of our proposed HMM
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procedure developed to estimate the super-exponential Sornette-Andersen bubble model from the
perspective of a state-dependent regime-switching process.
In order to formulate the HMM, we assume there is an underlying stochastic state process st
that indicates the prevalence of speculative trading, which is unobserved by the investors. The
state is switching between 0 and 1, signalling respectively the “normal” and bubble states. We use
qi j = 〈 st = j | st−1 = i 〉 , i, j = 0, 1 (8)
to denote the element (i, j) of the Markov-chain transition probability matrix.
Two cases must be considered in the absence of switching, whose specifications derive straight-
forwardly from the definition of the Sornette-Andersen model:
• (st, st−1) = (0, 0): The market remains in the state without bubble. Therefore, the price
dynamics pt follows the geometric Brownian motion, i.e., yt | yt−1 ∼ N(µ0 + yt−1, σ20),
where yt = ln pt. Specifically, the transition probability for yt is expressed as
ln〈 yt | st = 0, st−1 = 0, yt−1 〉 = −12 ln 2pi − lnσ0 −
1
2
·
(
yt − yt−1 − µ0
σ0
)2
. (9)
• (st, st−1) = (1, 1): The market is experiencing a continuing super-exponential bubble char-
acterized by the prevalence of speculation and herding associated with positive feedback.
Hence, the price dynamics pt is captured by the Sornette-Andersen model summarized
by eq.(5) in the absence of crash. The corresponding discrete formulation, p−nt | p−nt−1 ∼N(p−nt−1 − nµ1, n2σ21) leads to the transition probability for yt (See Appendix B for the de-
tailed proof) given by
ln〈 yt | st = 1, st−1 = 1, yt−1 〉 = −12 ln 2pi− ln nσ1 −
1
2
·
(
e−nyt − e−nyt−1 + nµ1
nσ1
)2
+ ln n− nyt .
(10)
In the presence of a regime switch, we have to make some additional assumption and we
choose the simplest possible one:
〈 yt | st = 0, st−1 = 1, yt−1 〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1µ0
∣∣∣∣∣ · 1{−κ≤yt<yt−1} (11)
〈 yt | st = 1, st−1 = 0, yt−1 〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1µ1
∣∣∣∣∣ · 1{yt−1≤yt≤κ}, (12)
where 1{condition} is the indicator function that equals to 1 when condition is met, otherwise it gives
0. Expression (11) writes that, at the time when a bubble ends, the price drops by an amount that
is bounded by the crash amplitude κ. Similarly, expression (12) expresses that, a bubble starts, the
price tends to appreciate. We bound the maximum amplitude of appreciation by the scale set by
κ. The simplicity of (11) and (12) allows for an analytical expression of the likelihood function,
which is convenient for its maximisation and determination of the model parameters, as we shall
seen below.
The price dynamics of our state-dependent Markov-switching periodically collapsing bubble
model is entirely encoded in the vector of parameters θ = (µ0, σ0, µ1, σ1, n, q00, q11, q01, q10). Be-
cause the underlying state variable st is hidden, it is natural to apply the Expectation-Maximumization
(EM) algorithm to estimate θ (Dempster et al., 1977; Kim and Nelson, 1999). In a nutshell, the
EM algorithm is implemented by iteratively performing two steps until meeting the convergence
condition : (1) calculation of the expectation of the log-likelihood evaluated using the current pa-
rameters estimates (called E-step) and (2) maximization of the obtained averaged log-likelihood
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function to obtain the optimized posterior estimates (called M-step). Applied to our model, the
E-step reads
lnLθ |θ(k−1) =
∑
1···T
(
ln〈 yT(, sT( |θ
)
〈 yT(, sT( | θ(k−1) (13)
where the notation ·T( means that the corresponding variable is multidimensional and covers all
the time steps from the start 0 to the end T of the time window. The symbol
∑
1···T
means that the
summation over all states st, t = 1, · · · ,T is performed. The above expectation step (13) can be
expanded into (See Appendix C.1 for the detailed derivation)
lnLθ(k) |θ(k−1) = 〈 yT( |θ(k−1) ·

T∑
t=1
∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
(
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ(k) + ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ(k)
)
〈 st−1, st | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

(14)
In the M-step (See Appendix C.2, C.3 and C.4), we then obtain the following expressions for
the corresponding posterior estimates of the parameters:
• µ(k)0 =
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t(yt − yt−1)∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t
, ω(k−1)(0,0);t := 〈 st = 0, st−1 = 0 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
• σ(k)0 =
√√∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t(yt − yt−1 − µ(k)0 )2∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t
, ω(k−1)(0,0);t := 〈 st = 0, st−1 = 0 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
• µ(k)1 =
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t(p
−n
t−1 − p−nt )
n
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t
, ω(k−1)(1,1);t := 〈 st = 1, st−1 = 1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
• σ(k)1 =
√√∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t(p
−n
t − p−nt−1 + nµ(k)1 )2
n2
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t
, ω(k−1)(1,1);t := 〈 st = 1, st−1 = 1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
• The value n(k) is solution of the following nonlinear univariate equation
T∑
t=1
− (p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1)(−p−nt ln pt + p−nt−1 ln pt−1 + µ1)
n2σ21
+
1
n
− ln pt
 ω(k−1)(1,1):t = 0 (15)
• q(k)i j =
∑T
t=1〈 st = j, st−1 = i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)∑T
t=1〈 st−1 = i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
, i, j = 0, 1
In order to use these expressions, we need to have the values of ω(k−1)(0,0);t and ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t, which
requires to determine 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉 and 〈 st | yT( 〉. For this, we first adopt a Hamilton filtering
procedure (see (Hamilton, 1989)) to obtain 〈 st | yt( 〉, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , which can be decomposed in
three steps:
1. Prediction Step: from 〈 st−1 | yt−1( 〉 to 〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( 〉
〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( 〉 = 〈 st, st−1 | · |yt−1( 〉 = (〈 st | st−1 〉〈 st−1 |) · |yt−1( 〉 = 〈 st | st−1, yt−1( 〉〈 st−1 | yt−1( 〉
= 〈 st | st−1 〉〈 st−1 | yt−1( 〉 (16)
This is nothing but the composed conditional joint density (See Appendix A).
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2. Updating Step: from 〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( 〉 to 〈 st, st−1 | yt( 〉
〈 st, st−1 | yt( 〉 = 〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( , yt 〉 = 〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( 〉
〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉
〈 yt | yt−1( 〉
(17)
=
〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( 〉∑
t−1,t〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉〈 st, st−1 | yt−1( 〉
(18)
The validity of eq. (17) is based on the multivariate Bayesian formula (See Appendix A for
details).
3. Summation Step: from 〈 st, st−1 | yt( 〉 to 〈 st | yt( 〉
〈 st | yt( 〉 = 〈 st | ·
∑
t−1
|st−1 〉〈 st−1 |
 |yt( 〉 = ∑
t−1
〈 st | st−1 〉〈 st−1 |
 |yt( 〉 = ∑
t−1
〈 st, st−1 |
 |yt( 〉
=
∑
t−1
〈 st, st−1 | yt( 〉 (19)
This provides the filtering probability 〈 st | yt( 〉, which quantifies the probability for a given
bubble state to be present, based on the current available market information.
Second, with the obtained filtering probability, we take advantage of a backward smoothing
approach to estimate 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉 and 〈 st | yT( 〉, which is inspired by Kim’s smoothing routine
(See Kim and Nelson (1999) for a discussion therein). Let y(t+1 denote all of the remaining log-
prices ln(pt) expressed at time following time t in the observation window from 1 to T , i.e.,
yT( = {yt(, y(t+1}. The backward prediction is then expressed as
〈 st+1, st | yT( 〉 = 〈 st | st+1, yT( 〉〈 st+1 | yT( 〉 = 〈 st | st+1, yt(, y(t+1 〉〈 st+1 | yT( 〉 (20)
= 〈 st | st+1, yt( 〉〈 st+1 | yT( 〉 = 〈 st | yt( 〉
〈 st+1 | st, yt( 〉
〈 st+1 | yt( 〉 〈 st+1 | y
T
( 〉 (21)
= 〈 st | yt( 〉〈 st+1 | yT( 〉
〈 st+1 | st 〉∑
t〈 st+1 | st 〉〈 st | yt( 〉
. (22)
The derivation of the r.h.s. in (21) is based on the multivariate Bayesian formula (See Appendix
A). The detailed derivation from (20) to (21) can be found in Appendix C.5. This finally leads to
the following expression to calculate 〈 st | yT( 〉, which can be called smoothing probability:
〈 st | yT( 〉 =
∑
t+1
〈 st | st+1 〉〈 st+1 | yT( 〉 =
∑
t+1
〈 st+1, st | yT( 〉, t = 1, · · · ,T − 1 . (23)
As its mathematical denotation to indicate, the smoothing probability 〈 st | yT( 〉 measures the
likelihood of the existence of bubbles in a given time interval by including the information of
future prices. For our purpose of diagnosing a bubble and its possible dangerous time period for
a burst, it is necessary to use the causal filtering probability 〈 st | yt( 〉 and not the non-causal
smoothing probability 〈 st | yT( 〉. The later can however be useful for parameter estimations,
which themselves impact on bubble detection.
2.3 Empirical estimation of the bubble probability in 16 financial
markets
Figs. 1 and 2 show the estimated daily smoothing probability for the presence of super-explosive
bubbles based on the HMM procedure in sixteen different global financial markets, represented
by their major stock indices. Correspondingly, Figs. 3 and 4 display the estimated daily filtering
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Figure 1: Estimated daily smoothing probabilities 〈 st | yT( 〉 of the periodical collapsing super-exponential
growth bubble embedded in the Hidden Markov Modeling (HMM) procedure represented with the palegreen
thin continuous curve bouncing between 0 and 1 for eight stock exchanges: U.S. (Nasdaq and S&P500),
U.K., Japan, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. All indices are given in logarithmic scale and are
rescaled into [0,1] for comparison. In order to mitigate the effects of identifying regime-shift too of-
ten as a result of daily price volatility, all indices are geometrically averaged over 100 days according to
ln pfilteredt = (1/100)
∑99
i=0 ln pt−i, before implementing the EM algorithm.
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Figure 2: same as figure 1 for eight typical indices from stock exchanges of BRICs and other Asian markets,
including China mainland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Russia, Brazil, India and Korea.
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Figure 3: Estimated daily filtering probabilities 〈 st | yt( 〉 of the periodical collapsing super-exponential growth
bubble embedded in the Hidden Markov Modeling (HMM) procedure represented with the palegreen thin con-
tinuous curve bouncing between 0 and 1 for eight stock exchanges: U.S. (Nasdaq and S&P500), U.K., Japan,
France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. All indices are given in logarithmic scale and are rescaled into [0,1]
for comparison. In order to mitigate the effects of identifying regime-shift too often as a result of daily price
volatility, all indices are geometrically averaged over 100 days according to ln pfilteredt = (1/100)
∑99
i=0 ln pt−i,
before implementing the EM algorithm.
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Figure 4: same as figure 3 for eight typical indices from stock exchanges of BRICs and other Asian markets,
including China mainland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Russia, Brazil, India and Korea.
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probability for the presence of super-explosive bubbles for the same sixteen global financial mar-
kets. The studied stock indices include the US NASDAQ index and S&P 500 stock index from the
New York Stock Exchange, the FTSE 100 index from London Stock Exchange, the Nikkei 225
index from Tokyo Stock Exchange, the CAC40 stock index from Euronext Paris, the DAX index
from Frankfurt Stock Exchange in Germany, Switzerland’s blue-chip stock market index (SMI),
the FTSE MIB stock index from Borsa Italiana, the two major stock indices from Chinese stock
market (Shanghai composite index and Shenzhen composite index), the Hang Seng index from
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the Straits Times stock index from Singapore Exchange, the Rus-
sia Trading System (RTS) index from Moscow Stock Echange, the Bovespa index from the Sa˜o
Paulo Stock, Mercantile & Futures Exchange, the SENSEX index from Bombay Stock Exchange
in India and the Korea Composite Stock Price Index(KOSPI). In the implementation of our EM
procedure, the condition of convergence of the algorithm is specified as
∆ =
lnLθ(k+1) |θ(k) − lnLθ(k) |θ(k−1)
lnL′θ(k) |θ(k−1)
≤ 0.0001 (24)
Several observations are worth describing.
• There is an excellent correspondence between the estimated daily smoothing and filtering
probabilities in essentially all cases: the periods identified in the super-exponential bubble state
with the smoothing probability 〈 st | yT( 〉 using the information contained in the complete time
series match remarkably closely those intervals identified in the super-exponential bubble state
with the causal filtering probability 〈 st | yt( 〉 that use data up to the running present time t. This
is perhaps not too surprising since our bubble detection method does not rely on the existence
of a crash or change of regime but solely on the identification of a transient super-exponential
dynamics.
• It is quite striking that the periods identified in the super-exponential bubble state are in
general associated with a strong upward price dynamics (not a surprise from the construction
of the model) ending with a peak of the price followed by a clear change of price regime (this
second property being much less trivial). This change can take the form of a significant correction
or crash, of a sideway volatile dynamics or of a downward price momentum. The presence of
such changes of regime is a pleasant qualitative confirmation of one of the key insights of super-
exponential models, namely the non-sustainable nature of the price dynamics that has to break
into a slower growth, in fact often a reversal.
• While most bubble researchers would agree on the diagnostic of a bubble in a number of
cases found to correspond to large values of our smoothing and filtering probabilities, such as
during the price ascent associated with the dot-com bubble in Western markets, which is here
correctly identified by our method, one could raise the criticism that many periods are picked
out that do not correspond to the times of well-documented bubbles, raising the spectrum of
too many false alarms (false positives or errors of type I). In response to this, we argue that, as
said above, most of these identified bubble periods are followed by a significant change of price
regime, which can be taken as a validation of the bubble identification. Moreover, it is the goal
of a better model with superior implementation to indeed reveal hitherto hidden aspects of the
price dynamics. Thus, it should not be a surprise that our method identifies a number of bubble
regimes that would have not been suspected by other means. Figs. 1-4 thus lead us to conjecture
that financial markets are much more often in bubble states that previous believed.
We have quantified the fractions of time, weighted by the corresponding probabilities, that the
16 studied markets are in a bubble. Table1 below lists the results, with the fractions expressed
as percentages. The notations p.b(filter) and p.b(smoothing) indicate the fractions of time when
markets are in a bubble regime, as determined respectively by filtering probabilities and smoothing
probabilities. These fractions are obtained as the integral of the corresponding probabilities shown
in Fig. 1 - 4 over the whole time period for each of the 16 investigated markets. Except for the
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Russian market with fractions as low as 8%, the chance for western stock markets to be in bubble
regime is typically in the range 10%-15% cross-sectionally. In contrast, emerging markets as well
as Japan market, the only developed market in Asia, are found about 20% to 45% of the time
in the bubble regime. This may due to the less transparent information environment as well as
weaker regulatory control, which tends to promote herding.
Table 1: Fractions of time that the sixteen studied stock markets are in bubble regime. We give the
fractions with only two digits, as a higher precision would be provide a misleading sense of accuracy.
Stock Index p.b(filter,%) p.b(smoothing,%)
NASDAQ 15 16
SP500 12 12
FTSE 10 11
RTSI 8 9
CAC40 12 13
DAX 11 11
MIB 12 13
SMI 12 13
N225 40 43
SSEC 30 30
SZSC 32 32
HSI 24 25
STI 27 28
BVSP 46 46
SENSEX 36 38
KS11 23 23
• The previous remark raised the issue of false positives. What about false negatives or errors
of type II? Some studies have suggested that the run-ups of stock market prices of Western mar-
kets from 2003 to 2007 qualify as a bubble (Sornette and Woodard, 2010; Sornette and Cauwels,
2014, 2015). In contrast, Figs. 1 and Fig. 3 give a zero bubble probability for this time interval for
all Western markets. One likely explanation of these missed targets was advanced by Andersen
and Sornette (2004), who stressed that, by construction the (Sornette and Andersen, 2002) model
assumes that bubbles are associated to both a super-exponential price appreciation and a corre-
sponding explosion of the volatility. But Andersen and Sornette (2004) showed that, for a number
of historical bubbles, this is counterfactual: many bubbles develop without a clear increase of
volatility, which would then lead the Sornette-Andersen model to be rejected. Indeed, many bub-
bles are developing over a time of complacent view of the underlying risks, in other words, the
genuine risks are under-estimated and the crash often comes as a surprise. This led Andersen
and Sornette (2004) to suggest the existence of at least two types of bubbles, the “fearful” (resp.
“fearless”) bubbles associated with an increasing (resp. constant or decreasing) volatility. Our
present investigation can thus be understood as targeting only the fearful bubbles.
3 Speculative Influence Network
3.1 Definitions
We introduce the Speculative Influence Network (SIN) as a directional weighted network of fi-
nancial assets, such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, real estate, forex, commodities, derivatives
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and so on, which is organized to map the mutual relationships representing the speculative influ-
ences between them, i.e., how speculative trading of one asset may draw speculative trading in
another assets. The arrow of a link in the SIN then indicates the direction of the speculative trad-
ing influence, and its weight quantifies the intensity of the influence. In order to derive the causal
speculative influence between assets, we propose a two-steps procedure: (i) estimate for each asset
the daily filtering probability for the presence of super-explosive bubbles using the HMM based
approach developed in Section 2.2 with the regime-switching Sornette-Andersen bubble model;
(ii) once two assets are diagnosed as being in a bubble state, identify the possible causal flow of
the probabilities from one asset to the other in order to infer a possible influence or contagion
effect. In other words, provided one asset X is diagnosed to be in a bubble, we want to estimate
how much does it influences the probability of another asset Y to be also in the bubble state.
There are at least two well-known methods to detect causal relationship between time-series,
the Granger Causality test and the information-based Transfer Entropy (TE) formulation. The
former is relatively “cheaper”, being linear by construction, while the later encompasses nonlinear
relationship and does not rely on a model specification. Although the Granger Causality test is
more popular in economics and finance, it is mainly designed for multivariate linear autoregressive
processes with white-noise residuals. For general nonlinear stochastic time series, it provides only
an approximate measure of causal influence (Barrett and Barnett, 2013). Moreover, elegant proofs
show that the two methods are only equivalent for Gaussian, exponential Weinman and log-normal
variables (Barnett et al., 2009; Hlava´ckova´-Schindler, 2011). Our inputs are the time series of the
filtering probabilities 〈 st | yt( 〉 for all assets, which exhibit properties far from the conditions
of application of the Granger Causality test: (i) the 〈 st | yt( 〉’s are bounded in [0, 1]; (ii) they
exhibit strong non-Gaussian characteristics with a pronounced bimodality near 0 or 1; there is no
guarantee that they obey autoregressive processes. Therefore, we prefer to use the TE method in
the remaining of the article.
3.2 Transfer Entropy
In his famous work “A Mathematical Theory of Communication”, Shannon pioneered a novel
metric to quantify the uncertainty of an outcome from a set of possible events, the so-called Shan-
non Entropy. In order to capture the average uncertainty in a system that is comprised of a set of
events with occurrence probabilities pi, i = 1, · · · , n, the Shannon Entropy (SE) H(p1, p2, · · · , pn)
is required to satisfy the following three properties:
1. H(p1, · · · , pn) should be continuous in pi.
2. If pi =
1
n
, i = 1, · · · , n, then H(p1, · · · , pn) should monotonically increase with n.
3. If an event i can be further broken down into several sub-events, then the SE is updated by
adding the sums of the SE of such event with weights equal to their occurrence probabilities,
i.e., Hnew = Hold + piHi, where Hi is the value of the function H for the composite event.
Then, it can be proved that these three properties lead to the unique Shannon Entropy function
H = −
N∑
i=1
pi logs pi = −
N∑
i=1
〈 i | logs〈 i |, where the base s of the logarithm is arbitrary and depends
on the chosen information units. For example, s is often selected to be equal to 2 when the measure
is given in terms of bits of information. Shannon Entropy bears a lot of resemblance to Gibbs’
entropy, which quantifies the degree of diversity for a system’s possible micro-states. But SE is
more general and gauges the necessary external information inflow needed to ascertain a specific
micro-state for a event to happen.
When dealing with systems that interact with each other, the notion of Transfer Entropy (TE)
can be introduced to describe the extent to which the uncertainty of one system is influenced
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by other systems inter-temporally. Consider two systems U and V that are Markov processes of
degree kU and kV respectively. Let us denote the sets of possible events for U and V at time t by
ut and vt. Then, the TE from system V to U at time t is defined as
TEV→U(t) = −
∑
ut ,··· ,ut−kU
vt−1,··· ,vt−kV
〈 ut, · · · , ut−kU , vt−1, · · · , vt−kV | · logs〈 ut | ut−1, · · · , ut−kU 〉
−
−
∑
ut ,··· ,ut−kU
vt−1,··· ,vt−kV
〈 ut, · · · , ut−kU , vt−1, · · · , vt−kV | · logs〈 ut | ut−1, · · · , ut−kU , vt−1, · · · , vt−kV 〉

=
∑
ut ,··· ,ut−kU
vt−1,··· ,vt−kV
〈 ut, · · · , ut−kU , vt−1, · · · , vt−kV | · logs
〈 ut | ut−1, · · · , ut−kU , vt−1, · · · , vt−kV 〉
〈 ut | ut−1, · · · , ut−kU 〉
(25)
According to the above definition, the TE from V to U is just the difference between the
amount of uncertainty for U when merely measured based on its past information and its amount
of uncertainty when also taking account of V’s past information. Hence, the TE effectively mea-
sures the reduction of uncertainty of system U achieved by using the information of system V . In
other words, it provides an evaluation of the power of V to predict the motion of U. It quantifies
the strength of the causal relationship between U and V . In the following subsection, we show
how to use the TE to develop the SIN for financial markets.
3.3 Constructing the Speculative Influence Network (SIN) for a finan-
cial market
In the present work, the speculative influence relationship between two different financial assets
is measured by calculating the TE between the time-series of the filtering probabilities defined in
subsection 2.2 and illustrated in subsection 2.3, conditional on the two assets being in the bubble
state. For this, we introduce the speculative influence intensity (SII) from X to Y as
S IIX→Y (t) = T Ep fb (X)→p fb (Y)
(t) , (26)
where the time-series p fb(X) =
{〈 st = 1 | ln pX,t, ln pX,t−1, · · · , ln pX,0 〉}t=Tt=0 = {〈 st = 1 | xt( 〉}t=Tt=0
and p fb(Y) =
{〈 st = 1 | ln pY,t, ln pY,t−1, · · · , ln pY,0 〉}t=Tt=0 = {〈 st | yt( 〉}t=Tt=0 respectively denote the
estimated filtering probability of staying in the bubble state for assets X and Y .
According to the derivations presented in subsection 2.2, the filtering probability 〈 st | yt( 〉 at
time t only depends on the previous one 〈 st−1 | yt−1( 〉 at t− 1 and on yt. This is intended to capture
the idea that the level of herding at a given time is mostly influenced by that of the previous time
period (day in our empirical estimations). Using this property, formula (25) for the TE of V to U
can be simplified into
TEV→U(t) =
∑
ut ,ut−1,vt−1
〈 ut, ut−1, vt−1 | · logs
〈 ut | ut−1, vt−1 〉
〈 ut | ut−1 〉
=
∑
ut ,ut−1,vt−1
〈 ut, ut−1, vt−1 | · logs
〈 ut, ut−1, vt−1 |〈 ut−1 |
〈 ut, ut−1 |〈 ut−1, vt−1 | (27)
where U and V actually represent p fb(X) and p
f
b(Y), and correspondingly ut = 〈 st = 1 | xt( 〉 and
vt = 〈 st = 1 | yt( 〉.
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In order to use (27), we need to specify 〈 ut−1 |, 〈 ut−1, vt−1 |, 〈 ut, ut−1 | and 〈 ut, ut−1, vt−1 |. For
this, we divide the range [0, 1] of p fb(X) and p
f
b(Y) in 10 bins of equal width and treat each bin
as a unique identified event for gauging the presence of speculative herding. This coarse-graining
procedure amounts to considering two events within a given bin as being undistinguishable and is
performed to reduce the sensitivity to noise and minimize the impact of model mis-specification.
Correspondingly, the base s in (27) is set to 10 for the practical computing. Then, by counting
the number of different combinations associated with the value vector of time-series U up to a
certain day, with the vector for U’s values lagged by one day and with the vector for V’s values
also lagged by one day, all four distributions 〈 ut−1 |, 〈 ut−1, vt−1 |, 〈 ut, ut−1 | and 〈 ut, ut−1, vt−1 | can
be empirically calculated. 〈 ut−1 | is obtained by taking the ratio of the number of times a 〈 ut−1 |
in a given bin appeared in the vector U by the total number of occurrences for all bins types.
In order to estimate 〈 ut−1, vt−1 |, one must count how many times a particular combination of
bins, that the couple states (u, v) belongs to, appeared in the joint vector of lagged U’s values
and lagged V’s values, and then normalise by the total number of occurrences for the pairs. The
calculation of 〈 ut, ut−1, vt−1 | is similar to that of 〈 ut−1, vt−1 |, except that the counting is conducted
on bins triplets that appear in the vector obtained by joining all three vectors. The calculation of
SII between arbitrary pairs of two investment targets finally gives the SII matrix for the whole
financial market, which is the basic encoding scheme to derive the adjacency matrix that defines
the SIN.
The assets of interest are the nodes of the SIN. A relationship in which node Xi influences
node X j is quantified by SIIXi→X j and is represented by a directed link Xi → X j. This does
not exclude the possible existence of a direct influence in the opposite direction from node X j
to node Xi measured by SIIX j→Xi , making the SIN a bilateral directional network. In practice,
we use a threshold so that values of SIIXi→X j below this threshold are considered too small to
be of significance and only the transfer entropies larger than this threshold will be used in the
SIN representation. To further extract the leading influence relationship, we introduce the net
speculative influence intensity (NSII)
NSII Xi→X j(t) = SIIXi→X j(t) − SIIX j→Xi(t) , (28)
allowing us to reduce SIN to an unidirectional network capturing the net influence effects between
assets. In this reduced unidirectional SIN, only positive NSII values need to be considered and
are represented as arrows going from the influencer i to the receiver j (for NSII Xi→X j(t) > 0).
4 Early warnings of bubbles for Chinese Markets via SIN
4.1 Data and methodology
We now investigate empirically how the Speculative Influence Network (SIN) can help provide
effective early warning signals by dissecting a bubble structure via a disaggregated firm level
analysis. We show below that the SIN complements the more conventional bubble detection
method based on super-exponential growth signatures of the aggregated market, by providing
indicators of strong speculative influence (or contagion) that can be useful by playing the role
of systemic risk gauges. Our tests consist in quantifying the out-of-sample performance of the
prediction of the maximum cumulative lost proportion (%MaxLoss) of each asset based on the
SIN analysis.
We focus our attention on the Chinese stock market and on the special periods from 2006 to
2008 when the stock market exhibited remarkable signatures of speculation and bubble behav-
ior. Jiang et al. (2010) have provided a detailed synthesis of this episode, using the log-periodic
power law singularity model. Following a bearish trend that lasted nearly 5 years, the Chinese
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stock market rebounded in 2005. The most representative stock index for the market of A-shares,
the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite index (SSEC), reached its lowest point in 2005 at the
level 998. It rose exuberantly up to 6124 (corresponding to a relative appreciation of 513.5%)
over a mere two years interval. Meanwhile, the second most important index, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange Component index (SZSC), reached a peak of 19600 from its historical lowest point at
3372 (corresponding to a relative appreciation of 481.2%) over just eighteen months. Correspond-
ingly, the total market value for all stocks traded both in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE)
and in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) has grown explosively from 30 trillion yuan at the
beginning of 2005 to about 250 trillion yuan at the peak in October 2007. This made China’s
stock market temporarily the World’s third largest market. Since its peak in 17th October 2007 at
6124, the SSEC has dropped to the low of 1664 on 28th October 2008. Similarly, after its peak
at 19600 on the 10th of October 2007, the SZSC reached its bottom at 5577.33 on the 28th of
October 2008. For both markets, the total drawdown from peak-to-valley corresponds to a loss in
excess of 70% in just one year, surpassing all the losses incurred during the bearish period from
2001 to 2005. Such impressive and breathtaking roller-coaster performance with extraordinary
quintupling of the value of the main Chinese financial indices in less than two years accompanied
by a rapid shrinkage in just one year back to a longer trend make the Chinese stock market an
ideal specimen on which to tests our proposed analytics.
For the purpose of constructing the early warning signals, the SIN of the Chinese stock market
is constructed within the window from 2006 to the end of 2007, covering the period when the
market is still in its growth regime, without significant large financial sell-offs. The assets we
consider to construct the SIN are the Sector Series from the CSI 300 index, which are compiled
by the China Securities Index Company, calculated since April 8, 2005 and designed to replicate
the performance of 300 stocks traded either in SHSE or in SZSE with outstanding liquidity and
size. The sector series are sub-indices based on the stocks in the CSI 300 that reflect specific
industrial sectors. There are ten CSI 300 sector indices in total: Energy, Materials, Financial,
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology,
Telecommunications and Utilities. Because of the special role played by the financial sector in
terms of its almost unique large leverage, its essential role as credit provider to the economy, and
given its recognized responsibility in propagating systemic shocks to other sectors of the economy,
we disaggregate the CSI 300 Financial Index into its individual firm components, according to the
classification by China Securities Regulatory Commission.
Table 2 lists some basic descriptive statistics for the nine industrial indices covered in this
article. In the putative bubble phase starting from 2006 to the end of 2007, the table gives the
maximum and minimum values of those indices as well as their daily return µ and volatility σ (es-
timated based on a specification in terms of a geometric Brownian motion and shown in percent-
age form). The sixth and seventh columns respectively show the fraction of filtering probabilities
calculated daily (based on the method presented in subsections 2.2 and 2.3) that meet particular
criteria over the period. Specifically, column h.f.p(%) gives the percentage of times when the
filtering probability is larger than 0.9. Column l.f.p(%) gives the percentage of times when the
filtering probability is smaller than 0.1, indicating that the speculative bubble behavior is fading
away on that sector while it is active for the overall market. The last column (%MaxLoss) gives
the maximum percentage loss for each industrial sector over 2008. This loss is defined as the
RMB amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization of the corresponding
representative stock index during 2008 divided by the maximum market capitalization in 2008.
Similarly, Table 3 lists the same basic descriptive statistics for the financial firms constituting the
Financial CSI 300 sector index. There are 22 financial stocks respectively belonging to four sub-
sectors: bank, securities, trust and insurance. Comparing the two tables, it is quite impressive to
note the much larger variations of these basic statistics at the disaggregated financial firm level
in Table 3 compared to the non-financial sectors level in Table 2. One can also observe that the
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stocks of securities or trust companies exhibit larger daily volatility than bank and insurance com-
panies. However, such facts have little relation with the observed proportion of speculative days
h.f.p(%) and with %MaxLoss.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the nine chosen representative Chinese industrial indices. Col-
umn h.f.p(%) gives the percentage of times when the filtering probability is larger than 0.9. Column
l.f.p(%) gives the percentage of times when the filtering probability is smaller than 0.1. The last col-
umn (%MaxLoss) gives the maximum percentage loss for each industrial sector over 2008 as defined
in the text.
Industrial Sectors
time window: 2006-2007 2008
Min Max µ(%) σ(%) h.f.p.(%) l.f.p.(%) %MaxLoss
Energy 1078.1 7740.5 0.37 2.32 40.90 48.47 73.75
Materials 868.3 6419.4 0.38 2.23 27.64 59.23 76.03
Industrials 884.0 5342.9 0.36 2.04 26.60 61.34 73.35
Consumer Discretionary 893.4 5332.9 0.35 2.19 29.62 59.10 71.95
Consumer Staples 1052.1 7501.9 0.41 2.06 28.71 59.66 65.91
Health Care 833.7 5242.2 0.37 2.28 28.07 62.38 59.65
Information Technology 727.5 2694.1 0.26 2.27 28.80 54.46 74.31
Telecommunications 950.6 4163.0 0.29 2.36 20.54 72.39 67.29
Utilities 879.5 3738.9 0.28 2.19 30.31 60.01 60.07
In order to exploit the SIN analysis, we define a set of indicators that measure the speculative
influence effects at diverse levels of aggregation. The set made of the nine industrial sector nodes
is denoted by GI . The set made of the 22 financial institution nodes is denoted by GF .
1. SI-to-All measures the total speculative influence of a given node i to all other nodes, in-
cluding the industrial sectors and financial institutions:
SI-to-Alli =
∑
j∈GI∪GF
j,i
SIIi→ j . (29)
This indicator will allow us to identify those nodes that have a significant global influence
on the entire network.
2. SI-from-All measures the total speculative influence of all other nodes including industrial
sectors and financial institutions on a given node i:
SI-from-Alli =
∑
j∈GI∪GF
j,i
SII j→i . (30)
This indicator identifies the sectors or firms that are the most susceptible to the overall
speculative influence of the network.
3. SI-to-Fin measures the total speculative influence of a given node i to all financial institution
nodes:
SI-to-Fini =
∑
j∈GF
j,i
SIIi→ j . (31)
This indicator quantifies how certain institution and sector’s speculative behavior may in-
fluence the financial sector firms.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for 22 chosen stock prices belonging to the financial sector. Same
definitions as Table 2.
Financial Institution Abbr. Sub-sectors
window: 2006-2007 2008
Min Max µ(%) σ(%) h.f.p.(%) l.f.p.(%) %MaxLoss
Ping An Bank PAB Bank 165.9 1440.2 0.44 3.26 27.10 67.32 75.43
Hong Yuan Securities HYS Securities 12.0 202.2 0.59 4.25 20.75 71.48 76.23
Shaanxi International Trust SIT Trust 11.4 111.8 0.45 4.21 11.81 82.38 73.51
Northeast Securities NES Securities 9.0 369.2 1.26 12.38 8.75 85.41 81.61
Guoyuan Securities Company GSC Securities 2.9 61.8 1.26 10.30 11.42 81.66 78.27
Changjiang Securities Company CJSC Securities 4.9 76.9 1.18 10.63 30.15 60.79 77.17
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank SPDB Bank 16.0 125.1 0.44 3.20 34.75 55.88 76.66
Hua Xia Bank HXB Bank 6.2 40.2 0.40 3.34 23.39 67.71 71.06
China Minsheng Banking Corp. CMBC Bank 19.3 146.2 0.37 2.89 26.38 64.19 68.69
Citic Securities Company CSC Securities 7.2 162.9 0.62 3.79 14.87 80.84 66.84
China Merchants Bank CMB Bank 13.4 110.0 0.43 2.78 28.63 60.66 73.86
Sinolink Securities SLS Securities 4.5 166.7 0.88 5.92 13.68 82.47 69.85
Southwest Securities SWS Securities 2.1 18.3 0.96 3.20 24.15 71.95 78.45
Anxin Trust AXT Trust 12.9 152.2 0.78 4.75 11.52 84.59 72.66
Haitong Securities Company HSC Securities 38.0 626.8 0.61 4.33 6.99 89.92 75.51
Industrial Bank CIB Bank 22.2 67.7 0.40 3.24 26.78 66.20 80.68
Ping An Insurance (Group) PAIC Insurance 44.4 145.7 0.40 3.04 38.04 54.41 80.77
Bank Of Communications CCB Bank 10.4 16.8 0.09 2.78 21.62 72.99 73.09
Industrial And Commercial Bank ICBC Insurance 3.3 8.9 0.32 2.74 22.88 71.18 57.76
China Life Insurance Company CLIC Insurance 32.0 75.3 0.17 3.24 29.33 61.64 68.72
Bank Of China BOC Bank 3.2 7.5 0.15 2.41 24.59 65.31 56.69
China Citic Bank Corp. CITIC Bank 8.5 12.6 -0.07 2.97 30.83 59.90 64.21
4. SI-from-Fin measures the total speculative influence of all financial nodes onto a given node
i:
SI-from-Fini =
∑
j∈GF
j,i
SII j→i . (32)
5. SI-to-IX measures the total speculative influence of a given node i to all other nodes of the
industrial sectors (excluding the financial institutions):
SI-to-IXi =
∑
j∈GI
j,i
SIIi→ j . (33)
6. SI-from-IX measures the total speculative influence of all other nodes of the industrial sec-
tors (excluding the financial sector) on a given node i:
SI-from-IXi =
∑
j∈GI
j,i
SII j→i . (34)
In addition, using the net speculative influence intensity (NSII) defined by (28) leading to
a unidirectional network, we shall also use the following indicators obtained from (29-34) as
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follows:
NSII-on-Alli =
∑
j∈GI∪GF
j,i
NSIIi→ j = SI-to-Alli − SI-from-Alli (35)
NSII-on-Fini =
∑
j∈GF
j,i
NSIIi→ j = SI-to-Fini − SI-from-Fini (36)
NSII-on-IXi =
∑
j∈GI
j,i
NSIIi→ j = SI-to-IXi − SI-from-IXi . (37)
These indicators quantify the net speculative influence flux of a node to all the other nodes
(NSII-on-Alli), to all financial nodes (NSII-on-Fini) and to all non-financial nodes (NSII-on-IXi).
We want to detect what combination of indicators for individual institution/sector performs
best as the leading factor during a bubble phase to explain the %MaxLoss of a given node asso-
ciated with a large financial sell-offs during a bubble collapse. The corresponding leading factors
are good candidates to provide early-warning signals encoded in the SIN and to become systemic
risk metrics.
4.2 Early-warning signal extraction from the speculative influence
network (SIN)
To evaluate the predictive power of SIN indicators defined above, we first perform multivariate
regressions of %MaxLoss on different combinations of the 6 indicators (29-34). For the purpose
of completeness and to avoid unnecessary multicollinearity, 17 regression models in total are
selected. On the basis that industrial sectors and financial institutions play different roles, we
simplify the treatment by performing tests on group GF and group GI separately. The results
are shown in tables 4 and 5. All indicators are constructed with data from 1st January 2006 to
31st December 2007 and they are ranked before implementing the regressions. Without loss of
information and to avoid inflating the tables, we do not report the intercepts of the regressions.
For Chinese financial institutions, we find that SI-to-Fin and SI-from-Fin are both significant
determinants to explain their maximum drawdown in 2008, while their impacts are of opposite
signs. The positive sign obtained for the ranked value of SI-to-Fin means that the more powerful is
the speculative herding influence of a node towards a financial institution, the larger is the loss of
that node during the bubble burst. These results suggest the institutions with higher SI-to-Fin rank
are more likely to act as the leading speculative engines of the overall speculative mania within
the financial sector, with more inflow of speculative money during bubble. The negative sign
obtained for the ranked value of SI-from-Fin implies that the larger is the speculative influence of
financial institutions towards a given node, the stronger is the resilience of that node during the
financial sell-offs. The institutions with higher SI-from-Fin rank are more likely to be lagging in
the speculative frenzy and may be less exposed to the bubble collapse.
Table 4 demonstrates that SI-to-IX has also a high explanatory power for the loss sizes of
industrial institutions (excluding financial firms). However, different from SI-to-Fin, the larger the
speculative influence of a node on other industrial sector firms, the smaller is the loss during the
crash. In contrast, SI-from-IX has an insignificant effect, suggesting that there is little transmission
of speculation from the industry sectors to other firms. Additionally, table 4 also shows that SI-
to-IX has a high explanatory power for the loss sizes of financial institutions. Again, different
from SI-to-Fin, the larger the speculative influence of a node on all nodes of the industrial sectors,
the smaller is the loss during the crash for this financial institution. We also observe that the risk
transfer between financial institutions and industrial sectors is not symmetric. Table 5 shows that
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there is little influence of the variable SI-to-Fin onto the industrial sector concerning its loss size.
Meanwhile, given the insignificance of the variable SI-from-IX to explain the losses of financial
institutions shown in table 4, we conjecture that, during the bubble, the Chinese financial sector
as a whole only provided speculative money to other industrial sectors but did not absorb it back
during the crisis.
As shown in table 5, SI-to-IX and SI-from-IX both become significant determinants of the
losses of the industrial sector in 2008. This is very similar to the results obtained for financial
institutions listed in table 4. This also suggests that the nodes that have the leading speculative
influence on their peers bear the largest loss risks, while the followers are less punished by the mar-
ket correction. However, we failed to find SI-from-Fin to be a significant indicator for %MaxLoss
of industrial sectors. At first glance, this appears to be in contradiction with our previous conjec-
ture that speculative money is more likely to go to industrial sectors, and taken out of financial
institutions that have more influence onto industrial sectors as a whole. Noting that the financial
sector as a whole is nothing but a peer node within the network of all industrial sectors, it is pos-
sible that the total flow of speculative money emanating from the financial sector is not sufficient
to increase the risk exposure of the industrial sectors for this Chinese bubble. The %MaxLoss of
industrial sectors should be in large part explained by the overall circulation of speculative money
among all the nodes within the network rather than by the flow to and from a single node, such as
the financial sector. In other words, this shows the limit of a simple causal analysis of influences,
suggesting the importance of a complex nonlinear set of mutual interactions that cannot be simply
linearly disentangled. In hindsight, this interpretation is also partially supported by the lack of
evidence of the presence of systemic risks spreading from the financial sector to other Chinese
economic sectors through illiquidity, insolvency, or losses during the bubble collapse.
We also performed correlation tests between %MaxLoss and possible combinations of our
chosen indicators. To keep in line with the previously revealed relationships, the test first focuses
on NSII and then associates NSII with a possible global influence effect for specific sub-networks,
without making an exhaustive enumeration of all possible combinations. Similar to the above
regression analysis, the tests are implemented separately on group GF and group GI . All combi-
nations are ranked before testing. Table 6 presents the results based on three popular correlation
statistics. We find that NSII-on-IX outperforms other combinations to predict the rank of loss
sizes of industrial sectors. By taking account of other overall influence effects, the predictive
power decreases in agreement with our previous discussion of the regression analysis that the fi-
nancial sector had very little influence in transferring risks to other industrial sectors during this
bubble. Nevertheless, NSII-on-Fin has only a modest correlation with the %MaxLoss for finan-
cial institutions. However, when considering SI-from-IX, its predictive power increases nearly
twofold to become a significant signal. In agreement with our previous inference that financial
institutions do not show significant tendencies to draw “hot money” from the real economy sector
but act more as speculative followers, the present correlation estimations confirm that financial
institutions are less important in China with respect to the systemic risks building up during the
bubble, which is driven more by the real economy than the reverse.
To fully appreciate the impact of the relationships of speculation influence among various
industrial sectors as well as financial institutions, Fig. 5 provides a visualization of the unidirec-
tional SIN calculated by using data in the same time window as before (1st Jan. 2006 to 31 Dec.
2007). This network is comprised of two sub-networks, the industrial sectors with 9 nodes and
the financial sub-network with 22 nodes. Recall that this financial network can be regarded as a
special node in the former network but has been disaggregated as explained above.
First, the size of a node encodes the net transfer entropy (TE) from that node to all other
nodes. To make the network representation comparable with the regression and correlation anal-
yses presented above, we use a slightly different rule for the sizes of the nodes corresponding to
the industrial sectors and to the financial firms. For the industrial sector nodes, their sizes are
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Table 6: Correlations between %MaxLoss and different combinations of indicators given in the first
column, as described in the text.
Indicators
Correlation Statistics
Pearson Spearman Kendall
For Industrial Sectors
NSII-on-All -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
NSII-on-IX 0.41 0.42 0.28
NSII-on-Fin -0.25 -0.28 -0.22
NSII-on-IX−(SI-from-Fin) -0.14 -0.10 -0.06
NSII-on-Fin−(SI-from-IX) -0.37 -0.32 -0.22
NSII-on-IX+(SI-to-Fin) 0.22 0.27 0.17
NSII-on-Fin+(SI-to-IX) 0.12 0.10 0.06
For Financial Institutions
NSII-on-All 0.29 0.20 0.13
NSII-on-Fin 0.28 0.22 0.15
NSII-on-IX 0.00 -0.06 -0.06
NSII-on-Fin−(SI-from-IX) 0.47 0.39 0.30
NSII-on-IX−(SI-from-Fin ) 0.21 0.06 0.06
NSII-on-Fin+(SI-to-IX) 0.03 -0.02 -0.01
NSII-on-IX+(SI-to-Fin) -0.22 -0.15 -0.14
determined by the rank value of their NSII-on-IX. For the financial institution nodes, their sizes
are proportional to the ranked value of their NSII-on-Fin minus SI-from-IX.
In Fig. 5, all nodes are connected by their speculative influence relationship according to the
NSII indicator defined by expression (28), i.e., an arrow from node X to Y indicates that X has
a net positive influence to foster speculative trading on Y . The thickness of each arrow encodes
the magnitude of the total of 465 NSIIs between 32 nodes. In details, the NSIIs are rescaled into
[0, 1] by a dilation transformation. Then, the thicknesses of the edges in the SIN are proportional
to the rescaled NSIIs. To avoid overloading the figure, only the links with NSIIs that are above a
threshold are represented with an arrow, as they represent the most important speculative influence
relationships. In practice, the threshold was chosen to be NSII ≥ 0.3, which yields 58 instances
that account for approximately 10% of all links.
Finally, the color of a node encodes the rank of its %MaxLoss as shown on the scale in the
figure inset. The two different kinds of nodes (industry and finance) are considered separately
when calibrating the mapping function for node size and color.
Based on the colors and sizes of the nodes, the main information that emerges from Fig.
5 is that the sectors or firms that lost the most are those influencing others most. The second
message of Fig. 5 is conveyed by the directions and thicknesses of the arrows. One can observe
that some of the large nodes (e. g. Materials, Energy, CCB) receive many arrows pointing to
them. Given that their sizes encode the fact that they are the largest net influencers, the arrows
pointing to them reveals a second order effect that they also receive large influences (above the
threshold NSII ≥ 0.3) from a few other sectors or firms. But these large influences only contribute
a maximum of 10% of the total influence relationships. Thus, it is more the overall influence over
most of the other sectors and firms that dominate the amplitude of the losses, rather than the (large)
influence of a few. Rather than identifying a few systemically important sectors, the SIN analysis
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emphasises the role of aggregated speculative influences in determining global interconnectedness
and systemic risks. This interpretation is consistent with the results of the above regression and
correlation analyses, which have concluded that larger Net Transfer Entropies lead to larger losses.
The case of CITIC is special, as it seems to act as a hub for important two-way speculative
influences between financial and industrial sub-networks. With smaller NSII-on-Fin minus SI-
from-IX effect, this financial institution is, as expected, mildly punished during market correction.
At first glance, The Information Technology sector seems to be an exception with little net entropy
transfer to and from other industrial sectors but nevertheless a relative large loss. This can however
be rationalized by the important influence relationship from the financial sector (in particular
CITIC) that might also signal an invisible “hot money” transfer between the sector before the full
force of speculative herding revealed itself.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced the Speculative Influence Network (SIN) to represent the causal relationships
between sectors (and/or firms) during financial bubbles. The construction of SIN required two
steps. First, we have shown how to estimate in real time the probability of speculative trading in
each stock in the basket of interest, using a bubble identifying technique based on the Sornette-
Andersen (2002) stochastic bubble model. We have augmented the Sornette-Andersen (2002)
model by using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), which was specially designed to calibrate
regime-switching between normal and bubble regimes. Conditional on two stocks or two sectors
being qualified in a bubble regime, we have introduced the Transfer Entropy, which quantifies the
casual relationship between them. The transfer entropy provided a natural way to construct an
adjacency matrix and thus to introduce the SIN. We have applied this methodology to the Chinese
stock market during the period 2005-2008, during which a normal phase was followed by a spec-
tacular bubble ending in a massive correction. Introducing the Net Speculative Influence Intensity
(NSII) variable as the difference between the transfer entropies from i to j and from j to i, we
have demonstrated its skill to predict the maximum loss (%MaxLoss) endured during the crash
by the sectors and stocks. The statistically significant regressions and the graphical network rep-
resentation has allowed us to llustrate the matrix of influences among sectors during the Chinese
bubble. One the most striking result is the importance of the industrial sectors in influencing the
financial firms and not vice-versa, showing a very different interaction structure than in western
markets. We have also shown that the bubble state variable calibrated on the Chinese market data
corresponds well to the regimes when the market exhibits a strong price acceleration followed by
clear change of price regimes.
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Figure 5: The unidirectional Speculative Influence Network (SIN) for the Chinese stock market con-
structed for the time interval from 1st Jan. 2006 to 31st Dec. 2007. This network is comprised of
two sub-networks, the industrial sectors with 9 nodes and the financial sub-network with 22 nodes.
The arrows connecting nodes represent the speculative influence relationship according to the NSII
indicator defined by expression (28). The size of a node is determined by its net transfer entropy (TE)
from that node to all other nodes. The color of a node encodes the rank of its %MaxLoss as shown
on the scale in the figure inset.
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A “Bra-ket” notations for probability formulas
This appendix introduces a convenient mathematical representation of probability distribution
functions and of conditional density functions using notations involving bra-vector and ket-vector,
according to the following definition:
1a. A single ”bra-vector” 〈 A | means the unconditional probability for A.
1b. A single ”ket-vector” |B 〉 indicates the conditions where event B is assumed to happen.
2a. Scalar-multiplication for “bra-vector” satisfies the commutative law: k · 〈 A | = 〈 A | · k, k ∈ R
2b. Scalar-multiplication for “ket-vector” satisfies the commutative law: k · |B 〉 = |B 〉 · k, k ∈ R
3 The multiplication between a single “bra” and a single “ket” vector makes a complete pair-
wise bra-ket 〈 A | B 〉, which represents the conditional distribution f (A | B). The bra-ket
can be regarded as a number.
4a. The notation |A 〉〈 A | to concatenate a single “ket” vector and a single “bra” vector defines
the operator to transform a “ket” (“bra”) into another “ket” (“bra”), which leads to
• 〈 B | ( |A 〉〈 A | ) = 〈 B | A 〉〈 A | = 〈 BA |
• ( |A 〉〈 A | ) |B 〉 = |AB 〉 · 〈 A | B 〉
4b. Given A =
⋃
i
Ai, then
∑
i |Ai 〉〈 Ai | = |1 〉〈 1 | := I where I = |1 〉〈 1 | denotes the identical
operator such that 〈 B |(|1 〉〈 1 |) = (〈 B | 1 〉)〈 1 | = f (B|1)〈 1 |, where 1 denotes the whole
universe, and thus 〈 1 | = p(1) = 1 and f (B|1) := f (B) = 〈 B | so that 〈 B |(|1 〉〈 1 |) = 〈 B |.
Further, according to the previous defined notations, the classic conditional probability and
Bayesian formula can be rewritten as
• (Conditional probability formula): 〈 A | B 〉 = 〈 AB |〈 B | or 〈 AB | = 〈 A | B 〉〈 B |
• (The Bayesian formula): 〈 A | B 〉 = 〈 A | 〈 B | A 〉〈 B |
With the listed formal rules and the basic formula, we can easily give the derivations for the
following famous formula in probability theory.
1. (The Law of Total probability): 〈 A | = 〈 A | I = 〈 A | ·∑i |Bi 〉〈 Bi | = ∑i〈 A | Bi 〉〈 Bi |
2. (Decomposed Conditional Joint Density):
〈 A, B | C 〉 = 〈 AB | · |C 〉 = (〈 A | B 〉〈 B |) · |C 〉
= 〈 A | (|B 〉〈 B | ) |C 〉 = 〈 A | · |BC 〉〈 B | C 〉
= 〈 A | B,C 〉〈 B | C 〉
3. (Multivariate Bayesian Formula):
〈 A | B,C 〉 = 〈 A | BC 〉〈 B | C 〉〈 B | C 〉 =
〈 A | ( |B 〉〈 B | ) |C 〉
〈 B | C 〉
=
〈 AB | · |C 〉
〈 B | C 〉 =
〈 BA | · |C 〉
〈 B | C 〉 =
〈 B | ( |A 〉〈 A | ) |C 〉
〈 B | C 〉
= 〈 A | C 〉 〈 B | A,C 〉〈 B | C 〉
29
B Proof of eq.(10)
Proof. Since p−nt | p−nt−1 ∼ N(p−nt−1 − nµ1, n2σ21), one can get
〈 p−nt | p−nt−1 〉 =
1√
2piσ1
exp
−12 ·
(
p−nt − p−nt−1 − µ1
σ1
)2 . (38)
With the density transformation formula fx˜|y˜(x|y) = fx˜|y˜(φ(x)|y)|φ′(x)|, or equivalently
〈 x | y 〉 = 〈 φ(x) | y 〉 · |φ′(x)|, eq.(38) further leads to
〈 pt | pt−1 〉 = 1√
2pi · nσ1
exp
−12 ·
(
p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1
nσ1
)2 · np−(n+1)t (39)
From the definition yt = ln pt, and using the density transformation formula again, we obtain
〈 yt | yt−1 〉 = 〈 eyt | yt−1 〉eyt = 〈 pt | yt 〉pt (40)
=
1√
2pi · nσ1
exp
−12 ·
(
e−nyt − e−nyt−1 + nµ1
nσ1
)2 · ne−nyt (41)
Consequently, we have
ln〈 yt | 1, 1, yt−1 〉 = −12 ln 2pi − ln nσ1 −
1
2
·
(
e−nyt − e−nyt−1 + nµ1
nσ1
)2
+ ln n − nyt (42)

C Derivations for the equations in EM algorithm
C.1 proof of the eq. (14) from eq.(13)
Proof.
lnLθ |θ(k−1) =
∑
1···T
ln〈 yT(, sT( |θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1) =
∑
1···T
ln( 〈 yT( | sT( 〉θ〈 sT( |θ ) 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)
=
∑
1···T
ln〈 yT( | sT( 〉θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1) +
∑
1···T
ln〈 sT( |θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1) (43)
For the first item in the r.h.s. of (43), we can further obtain
∑
1···T
ln〈 yT( | sT( 〉θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1) =
∑
1···T
 T∑
t=1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉θ
 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
∑
/t,/t−1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)

=
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉θ ∑
/t,/t−1
〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)

=
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉θ 〈 yT(, st, st−1 |θ(k−1)

= 〈 yT( |θ(k−1)
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1( 〉θ 〈 st−1, st | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

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where the notation
∑
/t,/t−1
represents the summation for all states sτ, τ = 1, · · · ,T , except for st−1
and st. The second term in the r.h.s. of (43) leads to∑
1···T
ln〈 sT( |θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1) =
∑
1···T
 T∑
t=1
ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ
 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
∑
/t,/t−1
ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)

=
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ ∑
/t,/t−1
〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1)

= 〈 yT( |θ(k−1)
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ 〈 st−1, st | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

Thus, we finally obtain (14)
lnLθ (k) |θ(k−1) = 〈 yT( |θ(k−1) ·

T∑
t=1
∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
(
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ(k) + ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ(k)
)
〈 st−1, st | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

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C.2 Derivation of the formulas to determine the first four parame-
ters of the HMM
Since 〈 sT( |θ does not depend on θ = (µ0, σ0, µ1, σ1, n), one can ignore the second term in eq. (43)
when calibrating the parameters of the HMM.
In order to compute µ(k)0 , the first-order condition of the first term in eq. (43) reads
T∑
t=1

∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
∂
∂µ0
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
 = 0 (44)
which leads to
T∑
t=1
(
yt − yt−1 − µ0
σ0
〈 st = 0, st−1 = 0 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
)
= 0
=⇒ µ0 =
∑T
t=1(yt − yt−1)〈 st = 0, st−1 = 0 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)∑T
t=1〈 st = 0, st−1 = 0 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
=⇒ µ(k)0 =
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t(yt − yt−1)∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t
In order to compute σ(k)0 , the first-order condition of the first term in eq. (43) reads
T∑
t=1

∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
∂
∂σ0
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
 = 0 (45)
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which leads to
T∑
t=1
− 1σ0 + (yt − yt−1 − µ0)
2
σ30
 〈 st = 0, st−1 = 0 | yT( 〉θ(k−1) = 0
=⇒ σ(k)0 =
√√∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t(yt − yt−1 − µ(k)0 )2∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(0,0);t
In order to compute µ(k)1 , the first-order condition of the first term in eq. (43) reads
T∑
t=1

∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
∂
∂µ1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
 = 0 (46)
which leads to
T∑
t=1
− p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1
nσ21
 〈 st = 1, st−1 = 1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1) = 0
=⇒
T∑
t=1
(
−p−nt + p−nt−1 − nµ1
)
ω(k−1)(1,1);t = 0
=⇒ µ(k)1 =
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t(p
−n
t−1 − p−nt )
n
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t
In order to compute σ(k)1 , the first-order condition of the first term in eq. (43) reads
T∑
t=1

∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
∂
∂σ1
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
 = 0 (47)
which leads to
T∑
t=1
 1σ1 − (p
−n
t − p−nt−1 + nµ1)2
n2σ31
 〈 st = 1, st−1 = 1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1) = 0
=⇒
T∑
t=1
[
(p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1)2 − n2σ21
]
ω(k−1)(1,1);t = 0
=⇒ σ(k)1 =
√√∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t(p
−n
t − p−nt−1 + nµ(k)1 )2
n2
∑T
t=1 ω
(k−1)
(1,1);t
C.3 Derivation for eq.(15) to solve for n
To compute n(k), one should solve the first-order condition of the first term in eq. (43) with respect
to n, that is
T∑
t=1

∑
st=1,0
st−1=1,0
∂
∂n
ln〈 yt | st, st−1, yt−1 〉θ 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
 = 0 (48)
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which gives,
T∑
t=1
(
− (p
−n
t − p−nt−1 + nµ1)(−p−nt ln pt + p−nt−1 ln pt−1 + µ1)
n2σ21
+
(p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1)2
n3σ21
− 1
n
+
1
n
− ln pt
)
ω(k−1)(1,1):t = 0 (49)
Note that
T∑
t=1
 (p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1)2n3σ21 − 1n
 ω(k−1)(1,1):t = 0. Thus, the above equation can be reduced
to
T∑
t=1
− (p−nt − p−nt−1 + nµ1)(−p−nt ln pt + p−nt−1 ln pt−1 + µ1)
n2σ21
+
1
n
− ln pt
 ω(k−1)(1,1):t = 0 (50)
C.4 Derivation of the formulas to compute the optimal posterior tran-
sition probability from st−1 to st
Since 〈 st | st−1 〉θ(k) is only related to the second term in eq.(43), we can ignore the first term when
performing the optimization:
∑
1···T
ln〈 sT( |θ 〈 yT(, sT( |θ(k−1) =
T∑
t=1
∑
t,t−1
ln〈 st | st−1 〉θ 〈 st, st−1 | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

=
T∑
t=1
∑
j,i
ln q(k)i j 〈 j, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

Without loss of generality, the first-order condition against qi1 leads to
0 =
T∑
t=1
 ∂
∂q(k)i1
ln q(k)i j 〈 i, j | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

=
T∑
t=1
 1q(k)i1 〈 1, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1) −
1
1 − q(k)i1
〈 0, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)

Then we have
q(k)i1 =
∑T
t=1〈 1, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)∑T
t=1(〈 1, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1) + 〈 0, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1))
=
∑T
t=1〈 1, i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)∑T
t=1〈 i | yT( 〉θ(k−1)
It is the optimal posterior transition probability after the kth iteration, q(k)i j , when j = 1.
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C.5 Reasoning to replace 〈 st | st+1, yt(, y(t+1 〉 by 〈 st | st+1, yt( 〉 in
eq.(20)
〈 st | st+1, yt(, y(t+1 〉 =
〈 st |
(
|st+1, yt(, y(t+1 〉
)
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
(51)
=
〈 st |
(
|st+1, yt(, y(t+1 〉 〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
)
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
(52)
=
〈 st |
(
|y(t+1 〉〈 y(t+1 |
)
|st+1, yt( 〉
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
(53)
=
(
〈 st | y(t+1 〉〈 y(t+1 |
)
|st+1, yt( 〉
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
=
〈 y(t+1 |
(
|st 〉〈 st |
)
|st+1, yt( 〉
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
(54)
=
〈 y(t+1 | st, st+1, yt( 〉〈 st | st+1, yt( 〉
〈 y(t+1 | st+1, yt( 〉
(55)
By assuming that the joint distribution of (yt+1, yt+2, · · · , yT ) is irrelevent to st, we can elimi-
nate the denominator and easily recover (55) for 〈 st | st+1, yt( 〉
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